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**«МАЛЫЙ ОКТЯБРЬ В КАЗАХСТАНЕ» И НАЧАЛО РЕПРЕССИВНОЙ
ПОЛИТИКИ БОЛЬШЕВИКОВ В АГРАРНОМ СЕКТОРЕ
КАЗАХСТАНА В 1920-Е ГОДЫ**

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Аннотация. С середины 1920-х годов Москва стала жестко ограничивать автономию региональных центров власти в управлении республиками. Однако, попытки изменить национальную политику привели к конфликту с казахскими коммунистами. В ответ центральное руководство решительно свернуло прежний политический курс. Цель данной работы — показ многогранных результатов репрессивной политики 1920х годов. Новые экономические меры ознаменовали радикальный переход от ранее доминирующего животноводства к сельскому хозяйству (Муталиева и др., 2023). Реализация антинародных мер советским правительством, включая насильственное оседание казахов-шаруа в период с 1928 по 1933 год, привела к демографической катастрофе, резкому снижению численности скота и уничтожению национальных культурных ценностей (Садыков и Набиев, 2020). Политическое руководство республики оказалось расколото. Оценка результатов антинародной, авантюрной программы «Малый Октябрь в Казахстане» сможет выработать новые концептуальные подходы к пониманию процессов 1920-1930х гг.

Ключевые слова: местные коммунисты, политическая оппозиция, изменения в аграрном секторе 1920х гг., национальная политика, политические репрессии.

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«OCTOBER MINOR IN KAZAKHSTAN» AND THE BEGINNING OF BOLSHEVIKS' REPRESSIVE POLICY IN AGRARIAN SECTOR OF KAZAKHSTAN IN 1920S

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Annotation From the mid-1920s, Moscow progressively curtailed the autonomy of regional power centers in governing the republics. However, efforts to shift the course of national policy resulted in conflict with the national communists and the anti-Stalinist opposition in Moscow that backed them. In response, Stalin's leadership decisively rolled back the previous national policy. The aim of the paper is to show the multifaceted outcomes of this policy, including beginning of the repressive measures. The hasty implementation of economic changes made by the Soviet government, including the forced settlement of nomadic peasants between 1928 and 1933, led to a drastic deterioration in the demographic situation of the Kazakh people, a sharp decline in livestock numbers, and the destruction of national cultural values (Sadykov & Nabiev, 2020). The political leadership of the republic, however, was divided not only due to the fear of political repression but also because different options for economic reforms were being proposed.

Key words: local communists, political opposition, changes in the agrarian sector in 1920s, national policy, political repression

Historiography of the problem

The Soviet (Stalinist) model of building socialism was largely viewed through the lens of peasant protest movements and the issues surrounding the forced collectivization of Kazakh villages.

Foreign historians continue to rely on concepts such as "Stalinism," "repression," "violence," and so on. Peasant armed struggle, in their view, is: a civil war between city and countryside (Виола 2010); a consequence of Stalinist policies in the village (Грациози 2008)) and one of the strategies of resistance and adaptation to new social conditions (Фицпатрик 2001). At the same time, Soviet socialist construction in Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, was carried out through forceful means, with the formation of Soviet identity occurring simultaneously

with the creation of a Soviet nation. This particular feature of Soviet identity formation through policies of indigenization, including within the egalitarian nomadic system and in the absence of the necessary and promoted class struggle within national communities, has been noted by some authors, including A. Edgar (Edgar 2004).

Undoubtedly, clan ranking with incorporation into the power structures of the Soviet state exacerbated tribal conflicts, which was actively exploited by Soviet leadership (Bullock P.R. et al. 2013:67-78). The historically entrenched traditions of the Kazakh aul and its adaptive practices, survival strategies, and resistance were only discussed in the works of Kazakhstani historians such as M. Kozybaev, T. Omarbekov, Zh. Abylkhozhin, and others.

The revolutionary article "The Tragedy of Kazakhstan" in the well-known journal "Questions of History" established a new methodological model for studying the tragic episodes associated with the forced modernization of Kazakhstan. We should especially highlight two major historians who have made significant contributions to the analysis of mass protest movements, T. Omarbekov and T. Allaniyaev. They developed their own authorial concepts for evaluating the opposition of the aul/village to Soviet authority. The late T. Omarbekov, through his research, partially addressed many research questions related to uprisings, recreating a broad picture of popular protests against the policies of forced collectivization and the settlement of nomadic populations.

A detailed scientific review and characterization of individual works on the history of armed uprisings in Kazakhstan is presented in the book by Talas Omarbekov, published in 2018, which has become a sort of encyclopedic guide to the history of popular uprisings. According to the concept of T. Allaniyaev, who has dedicated over twenty monographs to this issue, armed uprisings and insurgent movements are viewed as "peasant protest evolving from the struggle of the upper strata/aul, represented by the bai and religious clergy, to preserve their socio-political and economic positions, to the ultimate expression of despair among the middle and poor peasants, driven to the brink of physical death due to violence, arbitrariness, and shameless exploitation by the authorities"(Алланиязов, 2022). The socio-economic issues of the everyday existence of the Kazakh aul set the main tone for political processes. Indeed, the need for economic modernization was driven by the plans of the Soviet leadership, and their accelerated implementation in Kazakhstan began with the arrival of F.I. Goloshchekin.

We must agree with his opinion that Soviet power in the Kazakh steppe did not exist, or rather, it existed in the form of "Sovietized atamkenders." The party leadership was forced to acknowledge that vertically, from "top to bottom," the rural community continued to maintain its social self-organization. I. Okhayon and A. Edgar are absolutely correct in asserting that the construction of a socialist nation and the formation of Soviet identity in the context of class struggle led to an increase in armed resistance from the aul/village.

Goloshchekin and Kazakhstan's political landscape

Starting in the mid-1920s, Moscow gradually stripped autonomous centers of power of their relative freedom in controlling the republics. However, the attempt to change the direction of national policy led to a clash with the national communists and the anti-Stalinist opposition in Moscow, which supported them (Казиев, 2014:17).

In Kazakhstan, the "change of course" in Soviet national policy is associated with the figure of F. I. Goloshchyokin. In September 1925, Goloshchyokin, who was nicknamed "Stalin's viceroy" by Trotsky for his harshness and lack of principles towards local cadres, took charge of the party organization of the republic. After assessing the situation in the republic, he remarked that "between October 1917 and September 1925, the Kazakh ASSR (referred to as the 'Sahara' in the original) had neither a Soviet government nor a Communist Party organization."

Goloshchyokin sent a letter to I.V. Stalin, in which he justified the need for a new policy, later known as the "Small October." The main goal of the republican authorities became the destruction of the traditional community and the subsequent mass transition of Kazakhs to a sedentary lifestyle. He understood that these measures would provoke protests from the local authorities, which implied harsh retaliatory actions against the opposition. In response, Stalin expressed full approval of Goloshchyokin's actions. "I believe that the policy outlined in this memorandum is fundamentally the only correct policy. I. Stalin." (Шакурова, 2018:28).

Goloshchyokin himself repeatedly stated that the history of Soviet Kazakhstan could be divided into two stages—before and after his appointment. In the first stage, "from 1920 to 1925, national issues prevailed over class issues... This was a time of factions, a time of the ideology of Alash-Orda. Since 1925, class issues have prevailed over national ones." Goloshchyokin saw his historical mission as the fundamental and radical restructuring of Kazakh society on a socialist basis and the fight against Kazakh nationalism and Great Russian chauvinism. He accused the national communists of being committed to the ideas of the Alash leaders during the first half of the 1920s and of factionalism that existed at all levels, from grassroots party cells to the leadership of the Kazakh Regional Committee.

The Kazakh opposition, represented by such party and government figures as T. Ryskulov, N. Torekulov, S. Seifullin, O. Zhandosov, N. Nurmakov, S. Sadvakasov, S. Kozhanov, S. Mendeshev, A. Aitiev, expressed its disagreement with new party line (Казиев, 2014). They believed that this policy should have led to catastrophic consequences in agriculture, destroying the traditional way of life of the Kazakh people. The conflict between Goloshchekin and the "national communists" became open in September 1926, when at a closed meeting, members of the Presidium of the Kazakh Regional Committee S. Sadvokasov and Zh. Munbaev criticized Goloshchekin, accusing him of dictatorship and oppression of national personnel.

At meetings of the Kazakh Regional Committee, Sadvokasov resolutely opposed plans to incite a class war in the Kazakh village and confiscate the bai farms, which were the economic core of this village. He criticized the position on the need

for “October in the village,” pointing out that “October is a civil war, and the party is for civil peace.” In his opinion, the role of the bai in the aul differs sharply from the role of the kulak in the village, since the poor depend on the bai not only economically, but are also connected with them through every day and family relations. Sadvokasov doubted the success of pitting the Kazakh poor against their rich relatives, in contrast to the situation in the Russian village, which went through the committees of the poor and surplus appropriation during the civil war (Жанбосинова, Омарканова, Сайлаубай 2023).

For the defense of the traditional Kazakh village, Goloshchekin and his circle labeled Sadvokasov, Munbaev and other “national communists” as ardent “nationalists”, “defenders of the baystvo and Alash-Orda”.

To a certain extent, we can agree that there was no Soviet power in the Kazakh steppe, more precisely, it was in the person of “Sovietized Atkamners”. It is quite understandable that local authorities were represented by the most authoritative people in Kazakh society, including those who were called bai.

The village continued to maintain its self-organization, protecting its vital and economic interests. The party leaders of the republic recognized that the remnants of patriarchal-tribal relations interfered with “... the implementation of the general line outlined by the Regional Conference and the Party Congress. For the Sovietization of the village and for more successful implementation of socialist construction, it was necessary to remove this elite, which controlled the development of the village.” (Жанбосинова, Омарканова, Сайлаубай 2023: 64).

Over the years that have passed since the Soviet Union established power, the republican administration and the existing socio-political system contributed to the integration of tribal relations into the political model of the republic.

It is not surprising that the protest movements of the 1920-1930s often contained, in addition to anti-Soviet slogans, calls for the restoration of the Khanate, “for Kazakh power,” against the Russians, for the abolition of taxes, against collectivization and state procurement.

Despite the successes of the Soviet government, one cannot help but admit the fact that the relationship between the Center and the national republics was far from complete harmony. First of all, this concerned the status and powers of autonomies, budgetary opportunities and rights, as well as economic specialization. In particular, this is evidenced by the fact that at the beginning of January 1926, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) V.M. Molotov, a meeting was held on the “Bolshevization of national personnel” with the participation of the leaders of party organizations in Kazakhstan, Central Asia, including other national formations of the RSFSR.

Later, on the initiative of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR T. Ryskulov and the Department of Nationalities of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, a “Private meeting of nationalities - members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and other representatives of the national

outskirts” was held in Moscow. (Чеботарева, 2008) During the meetings, the main contradictions between the leaders of the autonomies and representatives of the center became clear, especially regarding the status of the republics and the distribution of funds.

However, back in 1923 I.V. Stalin, in his note to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), prioritized the controllability of the huge state and its resistance to shocks. It should also be added that local party cadres negatively accepted the resolution of the Moscow meeting, calling their participants “nationals who had gathered by chance.” First of all, this applied to S. Asfendiyarov, Zh. Mynbaev and S. Khojanov. They were accused that the decision of the meeting was contrary to the opinion of Kazkraikom and the government of the autonomy.

Stalin's support freed the hands of Goloshchekin and his entourage, who immediately began to fight the opposition party leaders. The VI All-Kazakh Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted the line of the union leadership on the equalization of all nationalities in land management and the transition to a class approach in relation to the Kazakh village.

Under pressure from supporters of the “hard” line, the VI All-Kazakh Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (November, 1927) condemned the national communists. The leaders of the “national deviation” Sadvokasov, Munbaev and Sultanbekov were removed from the Bureau of Kazkraikom and could no longer block Goloshchekin's decisions and appeal to the union authorities.

Goloshchekin himself, after receiving strong support from the Center, no longer needed to balance between various factions and did not hesitate, strictly following the line of Stalin and his circle. The defeat of this group of "national communists" was simultaneously the defeat of the moderate part of the Kazakh Bolsheviks (T. Ryskulov, N. Nurmakov, A. Kenzhin, S. Asfendiyarov) ...having lost their potential allies, who were connected by friendly and familial ties with the leaders of the Kazakh national movement Alash. A significant portion of prominent Kazakh party members (U. Dzhandosov, U. Kulumbetov, A. Rozybakiyev, S. Seifullin, I. Kabylov, A. Dzhangildin) did not support the "national deviationists," while at the same time recognizing the danger of Goloshchekin's innovations in social and national policies.

In the early 1930s, the OGPU Union authorities considered the cases of direct counter-revolutionary activity by the Alash nationalists to be unproven, but they accommodated F.I. Goloshchekin and the regional OGPU. (Койгельдиев, 2009: 347-348). After Goloshchekin's recall, the Kazakh leadership refrained for some time from extensive participation in the persecution of the "national communists. "This was justified by the argument that "due to the historical and cultural backwardness of Kazakhstan, Kazakh nationalism does not pose the main threat" (Аманжолова, 2024). However, Stalin, in a special telegram sent to the Secretary

of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the VKP(b), L. Mirzoyan, demanded a focus on combating Kazakh national deviationists.

"To assimilate the Kazakh masses and the Kazakh leadership within the party is a large and difficult process," said Goloshchekin at the 6th Regional Party Conference. D. Sadvokasov noted at the same conference: "It is no secret to anyone that in Kazakhstan, at leading positions, it is mostly Kazakh national communists who hold power." Therefore, as he admitted, unlike in 1920, "we need to re-educate ourselves in the spirit of internationalism." (Аманжолова, 2015: 202). At the same conference, Goloshchekin put forward the slogan: "New cadres to leadership – further Bolshevize our party!" The rationale for rejecting the so-called percentage-based indigenization policy was as follows: "We discovered that, based on the policies of the previous period, we had already selected for the party, Soviet, professional, and economic apparatus all the literate and semi-literate individuals available among the Kazakhs (Kyrgyz)."

The main problem with indigenization, according to Soviet authorities, was the lack of a managerial apparatus and the underdevelopment of the education system. Therefore, in the early years of Soviet rule, a large number of representatives from the local population, who were critical of Moscow's policies, were brought into the state and party apparatus.

Part of the strategy for eliminating disloyal personnel involved purges within the party ranks. In 1925-1926, selective purges of village and rural party organizations were carried out, and in 1927, a nationwide party census resulted in 2,000 fewer communists in the republic. In the summer of 1929, following the decision of the November 1928 Plenum of the Central Committee and the 16th Conference of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), a new general purge began, which extended to non-party personnel as well.

By 1925, the regional organs had been indigenized by 8.3%. It is clear that the purges and repressions primarily affected the educated personnel who were the first to serve in Soviet state institutions. In his report dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the formation of the Kazakh ASSR, Goloshchekin specifically noted the contradictions between the first Kazakh communists, whom he grouped as "Mendeshevites," and the "intelligentsia that had joined the party under the leadership of Auezov, S. Sadvokasov, and ... behind them, A. Bukeykhanov." Goloshchekin insisted that, despite their "leftist views," the Mendeshev group still adhered to the party line, unlike the second faction, which promoted the "Alash line." Supporters of the national communists were expelled from the administrative structures, and the most influential Kazakh communists (Nurmakov, Ryskulov, Asfendiyarov, Murzagaliyev, Khodzhanov) were removed from the republic under seemingly legitimate pretexts at the end of the 1920s. S. Khodzhanov was reminded of his slogans advocating for the creation of a Turkic nation and his opposition to the national-territorial demarcation of 1924, which allowed him to be accused of Pan-Turkism.

F. I. Goloshchekin's assistant and future "Iron Commissar" N. I. Yezhov, in his letters addressed to Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich, held his colleagues—the

"nationalists"—in low regard and characterized Kazakh communists as nationalists infected with "national deviationism and factionalism."

The equalizing redistribution of land holdings of 1926

Starting in 1926, measures began to implement the equalizing redistribution of land, as the decision of the XV Congress of the VKP(b) on the industrialization of the country marked the beginning of a new important phase—the foundation of socialism.

To understand the logic of the authorities' actions, it is necessary to return to the characteristics of land relations in Kazakhstan in the first half of the 1920s. The New Economic Policy of Soviet power, which was launched in 1921, became a catalyst not only for the recovery of the country's economy but also for the reorganization of agriculture and the social structure of the population. During the recovery of agriculture, as a result of the land reform of 1921-22 and the involvement of the aul in market relations, the demand for hayfields and arable land increased.

Thus, this affected the clan-based land-use system. The number of middle peasants increased, who were oriented towards the market and sought to increase their livestock. From the perspective of the central authorities, following the equalizing redistribution in the Russian village, it was also necessary to carry out a similar redistribution in the Kazakh aul. In fact, land redistribution became a new "social land reform" in the Kazakh auls.

Kazakh peasantry in the mid-1920s was primarily engaged in livestock farming and led a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle. According to the 1926 census, Kazakh households were categorized by type of activity as follows:

24% - engaged in agriculture

33.2% - practiced mixed farming, combining livestock and agriculture

38.3% - focused on livestock farming

Unfortunately, the census does not provide information about the remaining 4.5% of households. (Дахшлейгер, 1965: 310).

Approximately half of the Kazakh households were nomadic or semi-nomadic. A characteristic feature of these households, and to some extent of agricultural ones, was the presence of hayfields and arable land at wintering and settled settlements. There were no precise boundaries for land use, so those with more livestock claimed larger hayfields. The People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the republic recorded in its documents that "bai households had access to the best hayfields, the best arable land... The structure of the Kazakh community allowed the economically strong bai elite to concentrate significant areas of valuable land in their hands." (Дахшлейгер, 1965: 309).

Naturally, this situation caused irritation and a desire for change among poor households and middle peasants. For the party leadership, complaints about the existing situation became a tool for implementing new policies. For example, in

southern Kazakhstan, the poor, united in the Koshchi Union of the Turgensky Volost, decided to redistribute land and water sources, noting that the best lands and water were in the hands of the bais. Thus, one cannot completely ignore the presence of economic contradictions between different groups within the Kazakh population.

On May 20, 1926, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Kazakh ASSR adopted a resolution "On the Temporary Redistribution of Hayfields and Arable Land in Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Areas in Unsettled Land Use." The resolution noted that the basis of the actual land use of Kazakh households was the inequality between different groups, with some possessing the best land. The decisions of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the Kazakh ASSR decreed that aul councils, with the mandatory participation of the Koshchi Union, should immediately begin the equalizing redistribution of hayfields and arable land among the aul households. A similar situation existed within the actual land use of individual households in specific auls. The redistribution was assigned to separate commissions consisting of a member of the aul council, a representative of the Koshchi Union, and an elected representative of the aul's laborers. The right to receive hayfields was granted to all residents assigned to the given aul, based on the number of consumers. The poor had priority. Additionally, provisions were made for the protection of hayfields from grazing, and it was specified that the poor could not be forced to migrate to summer pastures. The poor were allowed to rent out the hayfields. The councils and the Koshchi Union were instructed to strictly adhere to the principle of equalization. To this end, they were recommended to prepare lists of residents before the redistribution, with a particular focus on identifying poor families. In the future, annual redistribution of hayfields and arable land was allowed in accordance with the land code. Any complaints from residents were to be promptly addressed by the local executive committees on-site.

In June-July 1926, many districts of the Kazakh ASSR began the redistribution of land holdings. However, it turned out to be poorly prepared. The timing was unfortunate—mid-summer, when all the nomadic and part of the semi-nomadic population had moved to summer pastures and could not participate in the land redistribution. Many lower party and Soviet bodies had no idea about the upcoming mass campaign, and the land subject to redistribution was not taken into account. In addition, the justice authorities protested to the government of the RSFSR, considering the equalization redistribution to be contrary to the land code. All this had a serious impact on the results of this campaign. The leadership of the KASSR protested the protest of the People's Commissariat of Justice and continued Goloshchekin's line on the stratification of the Kazakh village. The party leadership believed that the poor, having seen the first results of this campaign, intensified their activity to protect their economic interests. The regional committee of the republic, in its report sent to the Central Executive Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, justified this step by its popularity

among the population. A proposal was made to especially take into account the interests of the middle peasants in order to coordinate their actions with the poor residents of the villages. The decree also applied to areas of irrigated agriculture, but did not apply to resettlement villages, since land redistribution had already been carried out there. The plenum of the regional committee of the KASSR, held in October 1926, reviewed the results of the campaign. He outlined the necessary measures to avoid repeating mistakes and to radically restructure land use in the nomadic and semi-nomadic villages. At the same time, the participants of the plenum noted the increased activity of the Koshchi unions and sympathy from the poorest part of the Kazakh population.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) authorized the implementation of a massive equalization redistribution in the village. By the spring of 1926, the workers of the aul received 1.3 million hectares of hayfields and 1.25 million hectares of arable land that previously belonged to the bais.

Redistribution of hayfields and arable lands in 1927-1928: discussions and methods of implementation

The course for the forced Sovietization of the Kazakh village was taken on the basis of the resolution of the Joint Plenum of the Kazakh Regional Committee and the Regional Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, held on November 25-30, 1926 - "On the construction of Soviets in the village and village." Republican party bodies demanded that "tribal leaders, bais and atkaminers deprived of voting rights be removed from participation in the elections, resorting, if necessary, to measures of administrative and judicial influence." (Омарбеков, 2007: 148).

At the same time, "taking repressive measures," as the authorities believed, "does not at all contradict the principles of Soviet democracy." As a result, the 1927 elections to aul and kishlak councils were openly hostile towards wealthy groups of the peasantry. For the first time, measures such as the expulsion of bais and kulaks from the village and from their native district, as well as imprisonment, were applied.

These resolutions served as the basis for the elimination of the major organizers of Kazakh agriculture, which led to the destruction of traditional forms of agriculture that had existed for centuries. However, without addressing the issues of land use and the Kazakh system of agriculture, it is impossible to understand the fundamental consequences that the aforementioned documents had on the further development of the republic and society. A heated discussion on the further socio-economic development of the republic unfolded in 1927-1928. On February 8, 1927, the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTSIK) of the RSFSR granted equal land use rights to the Kazakh population and the settler peasants.

However, the regional party leadership refused to implement the decision of the highest authority. Kazakh communists feared that lifting the ban on land allocation for settlers would open Kazakhstan to a new wave of Russian migration. The

removal of Orenburg from the republic in 1925 under the pretext of a predominance of the Russian population set a precedent for further territorial losses and caused concern among Kazakh leaders. Changes in the ethnodemographic composition of the population and an increase in the proportion of Russians could reduce Kazakh influence in the republic and create new threats to its territorial integrity.

On July 8, 1928, the Bureau of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the VKP(b) protested the decision of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTSIK) of the RSFSR and confirmed the priority right of the Kazakh population to land allocation at the state's expense. In August 1927, the Presidium of the VTSIK of the RSFSR established a special commission to address interethnic relations in Kazakhstan. The commission that traveled to the republic recommended starting the expropriation of excess land from the Kazakh population.

However, the resolution of the Kazakh Central Executive Committee (KazTSIK) and the Kazakh Soviet People's Commissariat (KazSovnarkom) on 'The Confiscation of Wealthy Households' dated August 27, 1928, turned out to be an extraordinary measure that was declared as a mandatory act 'to free the poor and middle strata of the population from economic dependence and exploitation.' (Омарбеков, 2007: 149). The basis of this policy was the concurrent destruction not only of 'exploitative classes' and former privileged estates but also of so-called socially dangerous elements. The latter, according to the new political line of the party, were represented by prominent figures of the Alash movement and party, as well as Muslim clergy.

Repressions were intensified by the adoption of a resolution by the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) and the Soviet People's Commissariat (Sovnarkom) of the Kazakh ASSR based on the 'Instruction on the Implementation of the TsIK and SIK of the Kazakh ASSR Resolution on the Confiscation of Wealthy Households' (August 20, 1928). According to official government data, 696 households were confiscated, but the total list of wealthy households exceeded 1,000 people. Taking into account family members, it can be argued that several tens of thousands of people were repressed as a result of this campaign.

Reallocation of hayfields and arable land: implementation

According to the finalized plan, land redistribution was carried out in all provinces and one district, across 28 counties and 161 parishes in 1927. It covered more than 400,000 households with a population of over 2 million people. More than 40% of these households were poor households. From the very beginning, it became clear that the analysis of the situation in agriculture needed serious revision and that the plan had been adopted hastily. For example, in the southern part of the republic, in the Jetysoi and Syr-Darya provinces, the redistribution was carried out only partially, as the local residents combined nomadic or semi-nomadic farming with irrigated agriculture. Due to the new circumstances, the redistribution of arable land in the south was halted, and preparations for a land and water reform were initiated.

However, the number of Kazakh parishes affected by this campaign quickly increased, as the redistribution extended to parishes not included in the Central Executive Committee's list. In total, the redistribution of arable and haymaking lands was carried out in 218 parishes, meaning that at least half of the Kazakh population was affected by these land reform changes. Most of the wealthy households were reduced to the status of middle-class households due to restrictions on haymaking and arable land. In the spring and summer of 1927, the redistribution primarily focused on haymaking lands, while in the autumn of 1927, after the harvest, the process of redistributing arable land took place. Essentially, the redistribution covered only the most valuable areas—winter pastures (kystau). It did not extend to summer pastures (zhaylau), temporary pastures (kuzey), or intermediate pastures (kokteu).

A very important criterion was the social gradation applied during this campaign. In the nomadic regions, it was as follows:

- Up to 5 heads of cattle (large) per household – poor (kedei)
- 5-25 heads of cattle – middle class (kunkurgish and aukatty)
- More than 25 heads – wealthy and bai.

In addition to these criteria, it was recommended to consider the size of hired labor and the involvement of family members in economic activities. The division of haymaking lands and arable land was carried out between large households, and then within them, between smaller households typical of nomadic and semi-nomadic farming. Moreover, measures to organize agricultural cooperatives were immediately implemented, right after the land was taken from the bais and wealthy residents.

Party and republican authorities conducted a mass propaganda campaign, publishing materials about the dominance of the bais in the villages and the exploitation of the poorest segments of the Kazakh population by them. The press featured reports from the field on the successes and mistakes of the 1926 campaign.

However, the republican press also highlighted the difficulties in implementing the new government land decrees. First and foremost, it noted a cautious and waiting attitude, as well as a lack of trust in the authorities. This applied to both the poorest groups and the middle class. They did not understand the objectives and did not believe the explanations given by the officials, who argued that the campaign was in the interests of the poor and the middle class.

The class consciousness of the poorest layers, which the republican leadership led by Golochyekin relied on, could not emerge automatically. However, the transfer of the best haymaking and arable lands to the poorest segments of the population on behalf of the state was effective. In his report dedicated to the 10th anniversary of the formation of the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KASSR), Golochyekin noted that as a result of the land redistribution of haymaking and arable lands, 66.3% of the poor and 26.2% of the middle class received land plots, thus becoming a reliable support for Soviet power. He specifically mentioned that

between 1925 and 1930, "sensitive blows" were dealt to the bai's semi-feudal relations. (Голощекин, 1930: 38).

On the issue of specific actions taken by the authorities in 1932-33

In this section, I would like to highlight specific aspects of the period from 1930 to 1933 that contributed to the worsening situation in the republic.

On November 11, 1932, the Kazkraykom sent a directive to all regional committees, demanding that in order to meet the grain procurement plan, they should not only blacklist individual collective farms but also go further—by creating a list of entire districts to be blacklisted.

The directive from the Kazkraykom and the Council of People's Commissars of the KASSR, signed by F.I. Goloshekin and U.D. Isaev, was published in all regional newspapers. It listed the severe consequences for those districts and collective farms that ended up on the blacklist, ranging from fines to the eviction of collective farmers who failed to meet the grain procurement plan "beyond the borders of the region to the northern areas and the resettlement of their villages by other collective farmers from different regions." (Омарбеков, 2007: 150).

In the conditions of strict administration, false belsenders (pseudo-activists) thrived, adopting the methods and techniques of bais, district officials (shebarmans), and activists from the period of "war communism." Completing the resettlement, which was planned to take three years, in just three days, the false belsenders immediately began to "transform" livestock farms into collective farms.

Thus, in certain districts, collectivization reached 70% of households in the Abralin district and 95% in the Dzhanybek district. In February 1932, during the winter in the Chuy district, hundreds of households were concentrated within a 150 km radius, with 400 yurts forming a "town-like" settlement, which led to the death of livestock.

The resumption of the work of the Resettlement Administration in Kazakhstan on July 20, 1929, by the central Soviet authorities marked a new phase of land colonization in the republic. The regulations for the Resettlement Administration in Kazakhstan were approved at a meeting of the bureau of the KASSR Regional Committee on April 3, 1929.

This agency, whose activities were regulated and funded by the All-Union Resettlement Administration, was not actually subordinate to the republican authorities, and its head was appointed by the leadership of the People's Commissariat for Land Affairs of the RSFSR. (Козлов, 2024: 44). Under the Resettlement Administration, 27,400 people moved to Kazakhstan during the period of 1929-1930. During the first Five-Year Plan (1928-1932), 498,500 people arrived in the territory of the KASSR, and internal resettlement reached 100,000 people.

All these significantly complicated interethnic relations in Kazakhstan and actively contributed to the destruction of the traditional way of life of the Kazakh people. The inhumane orientation of the Bolshevik policy, arbitrariness, violence against the peasantry, the widespread use of emergency measures leading to the destruction of their livelihood system, mass procurement campaigns and

confiscation of livestock, as well as forced collectivization and the settlement of nomadic and semi-nomadic populations, provoked open resistance from the peasants. These often resulted in armed uprisings, which were unjustifiably characterized in the documents of the governing bodies as bandit and counter-revolutionary activities.

Such a political assessment led the then leadership of Kazakhstan to a military and violent suppression of protest movements. Official data from the State Political Directorate (OGPU) for Kazakhstan indicate that between 1929 and 1931, there were 372 mass peasant uprisings in the republic, involving tens of thousands of people.

Conclusion

Many aspects related to the political decisions of the 1920s still remain historical "blind spots."

Thus, in the context of Sovietization, the traditional nomadic Kazakh society represented a general field of protest, reflecting the interests of clan-hierarchical structures in a positional manner. In their interweaving, one can observe various adaptive practices, survival strategies, and tactics of open/hidden resistance. In the initial stage, that is, until 1925, there were no active radical protest sentiments in the Kazakh aul, as the traditional system of nomadic economy and the interests of clan leadership had not yet been affected. It is very important to note that the trigger for open discontent was, on the one hand, the processes of Sovietization, or Goloshchyokin's "Small October," and on the other hand, the beginning of the confiscation of the bai and kulak classes. Additionally, these were compounded by accelerated collectivization and the fight against religious cults. In visual graphs, the sharp spikes of the sine wave of armed protest actions, which lasted until 1931, indicated not only the use of clan mechanisms to expand the insurgent movement but also the desire to defend the traditional value system of nomadic society. Soviet power was unable to stop resistance for a long period and only realization of the Stalin's industrialization project which changed completely political and social landscape of the Kazakh society was finally able to put an end to the armed resistance of the Kazakh peasantry, but this contributed to the rise of nationalist sentiments in society.

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